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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to identify and consider ethical issues relating to the international 
pricing of pharmaceuticals, drawing especially on liberal rights theories. It suggests why 
and how some of these issues might be resolved. It examines and critiques arguments 
presented by major pharmaceutical manufacturers. It addresses a range of ancillary issues 
like current pricing policies, R&D, intellectual property rights, rights to profits, the public 
good and regulation. It proposes a potential model for moving forward on the pricing of 
pharmaceuticals, with a view to increasing access to essential drugs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Pricing and Distribution of Therapeutic Pharmaceuticals – An ethical 
minefield 
 
The Context: Rights, Ethics and Ideology  
The international pharmaceutical manufacturing sector (Big Pharma) is a constant source 
of polemic and sometimes emotive debate. It is a sector unlike most in that its products 
have the potential to significantly improve health, and in many cases save lives. For that 
reason the international community has long grappled with whether or not such 
significant products should be left solely in the control of the private sector, and whether 
market forces should be allowed to determine access to products such as the anti-
retroviral (ARVs) drugs used to combat HIV/AIDS. Intuitively it would seem clear that if 
there are remedies/significant medications available to treat pandemics such as AIDS 
then society is morally obliged to make them available and accessible to AIDS sufferers.  
 
On deeper examination a raft of difficult, and virtually unanswerable questions arise out 
of this proposition. Which manufacturer’s products are to be used? Who rewards the 
manufacturer and how? Which epidemics are to be addressed? Do we relate remedy to 
the severity of the illness, must it for example be life threatening, or is it sufficient that it 
threatens eyesight, sanity, or sexual function? Should all drugs be treated equally? How 
do we define society? Do we mean citizens of particular states or do we mean everyone 
on the planet? How are the drugs made available? How might they be priced so that they 
are available even where national governments have per-capita health budgets of US$2 
per capita per annum? How can we ensure that, if the drugs are appropriately priced, they 
could actually be accessed by those in need? Should such drugs be available at the same 
price in poor and rich countries – should a millionaire AIDS victim in Europe or the 
United States be accorded the same price as a starving indigent in Sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
Once we raise these questions there is a temptation to offer simplistic responses like: 
“obviously the priority must be life-threatening diseases”. Even this relatively simple 
question exposes an underlying layer of complexity. One might legitimately hold that 
severe depression is potentially as life threatening as AIDS. Once these types of questions 
are raised we enter into the sort of difficult terrain that bedeviled definitions of relative 
and absolute poverty from as long ago as the pioneering work of Booth and Rowntree. In 
this case the arguments are very similar, we could say ‘relative or absolute need’ vis-à-vis 
the severity of the illness, or the individual’s ability to buy or access the drugs. This 
leaves us with a dichotomy about simple definitions on one side and the nature of ethics 
on the other. We would be naïve not to imagine that both discussions are interrelated. 
 
Concerns around the ethical operation of markets continue to resonate in political 
debates. While this is not new, today it is articulated in the context of an ideological unity 
never previously experienced since the emergence of industrialization. Neo-liberalism 
has positioned itself as the unchallenged dogma of enterprise, the starting point for 
understanding market forces and the driver for a new order in the global market 
spearheaded by the WTO. While there may be an unprecedented level of confidence in 
the market, there is a keen awareness, as Walsh (2004) states, that ‘economic processes 
can and should be subject to normative evaluation’(241). He connects this concern back 
to some of the leading medieval theorists who expressed concern about ‘the Just Price 
and the prohibition of usury’. This may seem peculiar language to adopt when addressing 
issues very much related with life in the 21st century. However the topic has an 
indisputable pertinence to the subject of this paper and specifically in relation to how an 
ethics of pricing of drugs might be achieved.   
 
Pogge (2002) clearly articulates a blind spot relative to ‘moral universalism’ when it 
comes to how the developed world views the abject poverty experienced by a 
considerable percentage of the world’s population who live in less developed countries. 
For him ‘socio-economic rights’ such as are enshrined in Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are ‘the most frequently violated human rights’(29). In 
short he says such disparities and injustices would not be tolerated within the nation 
states of the developed world, yet are tolerated vis-à-vis the less developed world through 
a sort of moral filter. At the very least this demonstrates a moral ambiguity, but may 
perhaps express as much a political pragmatism. Economic leaders may have as little 
taste for moral dilemmas at home as abroad, but may be acting as true rational actors in 
recognizing that utilitarian maximizing strategies are best achieved through a bifurcated 
strategy that eases public conscience at home while exploiting unrestrained market forces 
abroad. It is consistent to believe ethics have no place in the market and still accept 
political necessities. 
 
Neo-liberalism’s political climb to the ascendancy since the 1970s has tended to sideline 
ethical concerns in the face of the profit motive and the ‘greed is good’ mantra. This 
approach is built on an interpretation of the classical economics cannon, centred on Adam 
Smith (1776), which espouses complete faith in the market to solve all societal problems 
(if indeed the very existence of society is acknowledged) i
‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their 
advantage’. 
. Lynch and Walsh (2003) put 
this as ‘accounts of the profit-motive that purge it of all other-regarding elements’(43). 
Smith is presented as the prophet and famous quotations like that from his Wealth of 
Nations (Book One, Chapter II) are presented to copper fasten the argument:  
 
In terms of pricing policy for pharmaceuticals the question of ethics is both a practical 
and philosophical issue. In pure practical terms price policy is about profit seeking and 
the maximizing of potential returns. It is about addressing the free market to obtain the 
maximum return. At this practical level exploitation of the market at once brings personal 
or corporate gain, but also facilitates the notion of the invisible hand to achieve the 
common good of increasing wealth. For Smith the invisible hand is essentially the unseen 
outcome of individual rational choices supporting the common good serendipitously 
rather than arising from any moral motives by the actor to achieve that goal, apart from 
self-interest. In simple terms it might be considered ethical to act selfishly as that is what 
is required to make the market fully functional. Any deviation from this course could be 
construed as damping down the market’s potential. This leads to the philosophical 
questions which concern the meaning of ethics, intentionality and the meaning of the 
common good. On the basis of arguments derived from Smith and with the additional 
impetus of interpreting support from Friedrich von Hayek, the Neo-Liberal can hold that 
ethics has no place in the market and in fact could ultimately lead to negative rather than 
positive outcomes. Hayek’s seminal work The Road to Serfdom, occupies as sacred a role 
in neo-liberalism as The Wealth of Nations. Jones (2002) suggests it was  ‘… treated as 
holy writ of the Thatcherite counter revolutionaries of the 1970 and 1980s’. If Hayek is 
the latter day prophet, then his message is clear that all actions aimed at social 
engineering, planning and central organization are wrong. Pricing policy that contains an 
ethic of other regarding in Hayek’s terms is simply wrong. From this perspective pricing 
in the pharmaceutical industry that bears no relation to either need or ability to pay is 
perfectly consistent. 
 
While neo-liberals may be able to justify self-maximizing strategies as part of the 
essential workings of the market, they fall into the delusion of assuming that the market 
and society are one and the same. This is demonstrated with reference to Margaret 
Thatcher’s understanding of society as discussed above. This approach operates on the 
assumption that rights are unidimensional, while in fact they comprise of two poles–
entitlements and obligations. It is not just a case of the rational actor exploiting his or her 
autonomous rights, but as Kant (1991) outlined in The Metaphysics of Morals they are 
also obligated to act responsibly. This is drawn out in his second formulation of the 
categorical imperative: ‘so act that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means but always at the same time 
as an end’(133). Liberalism cannot survive on the basis of a disavowal of other-regarding. 
While the Neo-Liberals take their cues from Smith and Hayek, equal claims to the core of 
liberalism can be based on John Stuart Mill and Keynes. Rights cannot be understood 
only in positive terms. All actions have consequences. Responsibility or obligation is 
about taking on board potential consequences, seeking the balance is ethically demanded 
as Kant (1991) clearly outlined:‘Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the 
freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in 
accordance with a universal law is right’(133). 
 
Classifying Pharmaceutical Pricing 
Pharmaceutical pricing, and in particular international pharmaceutical pricing, is a prime 
illustration of the equivocal nature of many decisions in business. We classify them into 
three groups:  
1. Technical: This addresses the process of determining prices for individual drugs in 
relation to particular markets. It considers what relationship exists 
between price and the cost of production. 
2. Ethical: As discussed above this could be understood as the conflicting demands 
of on one side a Neo-Liberal paradigm based on utilitarian principles of 
a free-market stripped of any need for ethical reflection against a 
responsible paradigm emanating from a welfare Liberal paradigm 
epitomized by theorist such as Kant or Keynes. The latter still 
subscribes to a free-market model, but one not exempt from ethical 
considerations. 
3. Governmental: 
3. i. Regulation: Regulation is a word greatly despised by neo-liberals, but nonetheless 
Adam Smith was prepared to acknowledge that government has a role 
in the delivery of certain forms of public good ‘chiefly those for 
facilitating the commerce of society’ (Wealth of Nations: v.1.70). 
Population health surely fits into this category. When faced with a 
security crisis, highlighted by the events of 9/11, governments were 
willing to introduce a spectacular range of regulations. Why, it may be 
asked, cannot the same energy be addressed at health especially in the 
light of the AIDS pandemic and growing problems around diseases like 
tuberculosis and malaria. Should governments and intergovernmental 
organisations like the World Health Organisation (WHO), and World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) have a responsible role in regulating the 
pricing and distribution of certain pharmaceuticals and in relation to 
certain diseases. 
3. ii. Research All of these issues tie into research and development, free inquiry, 
cross-subsidization and the legitimate expectation to achieve profits. 
Dealing with these issues in the light of the common good is not in 
conflict with the essentials of a liberal free-market. Adam Smith’s 
concept of non-profitable public works ‘in the highest degree 
advantageous to a great society’ sits perfectly with these concerns 
(Wealth of Nations: v.1.69).  
 
It is clear even from this brief elucidation that there are many interconnections between 
these issues. If one considers the issue of the relationship of price and cost, it is impacted 
on by issues of cross-subsidization, degree to which the product fulfils an essential need, 
and target market. We have a complex web of issues that cannot be considered discretely: 
how can we responsibly deal with life-saving drugs; how and who funds research and 
development of pharmaceuticals; how can we exploit market forces to good effect; is 
governmental intervention desirable; how does cross-subsidization impact on the market; 
is the American market carrying too heavy a burden; how do we deal with parallel 
importing of drugs from low- to high-priced markets; who pays for drugs and how much 
should they pay (this is particularly pertinent for developing countries and economically 
marginalized populations). 
 
Context: The Market 
At Marrakech in 1994 World Trade Organisation (WTO) member nations signed the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, which 
established minimum levels of protection that each government would give to intellectual 
property of fellow WTO members. The agreement requires that 20-year patent protection 
be available for all inventions. One of the industries to benefit significantly from TRIPs 
was the pharmaceutical sector. Pharmaceutical manufacturers could expect patent 
protection in all member states of the WTO. This patent protection meant that for 
innovative drugs, manufacturers could set prices without fear of competitive response, the 
creation as it were of a time limited monopoly.ii
 
  
Over the following seven years there was intense international lobbying and public 
debate between Big Pharma and national governments and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Developing-country governments and NGOs such as Medicins 
Sans Frontiers (MSF) and Oxfam consistently argued that the international patent 
protection afforded to the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals under the TRIPs agreement 
had unsustainable implications for the public health of many poorer countries (MSF 
2003). They believed that such countries did not have the economic or technical expertise 
to manufacture their own affordable medicines and they had therefore to rely on imports 
of high-priced, patented pharmaceuticals. For example less than 5% of those living with 
HIV/AIDS have access to the most successful medications, due to cost considerations 
(AMSA 2002). 
 
At the November 2001 WTO meeting in Doha it was agreed that developing countries 
should, under certain conditions, be allowed to derogate from the provisions of the TRIPs 
agreement. “implementation and interpretation  of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property  Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of 
public health, by  promoting both access to existing medicines and research and 
development into new medicines” (17) (WTO 2001). The so-called Doha declaration 
meant that where the administrations of such countries were able to demonstrate that 
adherence to TRIPs would seriously impact on the health profile of a large sector of their 
population they would be allowed to override the obligations of patent protection and 
access cheap, quality, generic versions of the drugs to combat public health emergencies 
such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. A number of governments including the 
Brazilian government have successfully invoked the provisions of the Doha declaration to 
allow them manufacture generic versions of drugs used to combat HIV/AIDS. 
 
However many argue that the protection of intellectual property and high prices are not 
the reasons for lack of access to essential medicines in Sub-Saharan Africa, and other 
less-developed countries (Attaran 2004) They argue that in fact the issue is one of 
systemic weakness and the absence of a developed health system.  
 
This argument seems in part to be borne out by the experiences of Cipla, an Indian 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. In 2001 it offered a cocktail of ARVs internationally at less 
than US$1 a day, but there was little demand for it. Even at that significantly reduced 
price it was still too expensive for many HIV/AIDS-sufferers, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Additionally many governments in the region either cannot afford or lack the 
political will to buy such products. The WTO point out that many of the countries with 
severe disease problems have annual per capita drugs budgets of less than US$2. Attaran 
and Gillespie-White (2001) also point out that many companies actually donate drugs to 
certain governments, but the absence of distribution and administrative infrastructure 
means that they frequently do not reach the right people in the right way. It is clear that 
the issue of access to pharmaceuticals is not simply one of price. 
 
Neither is it an issue between the developed world and developing world alone. Such a 
dichotomy would suggest that in the developed world all necessary drugs therapies are 
available to, and affordable by, all consumers. While access to essential medications is 
more widespread in the United States for example, it is by no means universal, and is the 
subject of considerable controversy within the United States itself (Brody 1995, Spinello 
1992). Similarly recent debates over the so-called ‘post code lottery’iii
 
 highlight the 
variations in access to certain therapeutic pharmaceuticals in the UK. Health funding 
bodies, such as the Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) in the United States, and 
the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom have, in a number of cases, 
not included certain drugs on their formularies, basing their decisions on cost-benefit 
arguments. This has on occasion led to industry lobbying to have drugs added to 
formularies. Boseley (1999) highlights the case of Biogen who engaged a PR firm to help 
it rally multiple sclerosis sufferers to lobby for the NHS to pay for and prescribe beta-
interferon, a very expensive therapy. High prices therefore impact on availability both 
directly to individual consumers and also indirectly through funding agencies. 
Pharmaceutical industry perspective 
Big Pharma has consistently argued that high prices and multilateral patent protection 
afforded by TRIPs are reasonable rewards for highly expensive and often fruitless 
research and development of pharmaceuticals, which are ultimately of benefit to society 
(Medawar and Hardon 2004). Research and development costs in the pharmaceutical 
sector can be substantial. Cutting Edge (2003), a private sector industry monitor, 
estimated the cost as US$900 billion. Because of low success rates Big Pharma argues 
that profits from the few successful products are essential. This confirms Adam Smith’s 
analysis, as discussed earlier, but proposes a market solution in place of his governmental 
one. 
 
Brody (1995) confirms a correlation between industry profit levels and levels of research 
and development and subsequent successful innovations. It does not though make 
reference to the mitigating factors of tradition, and critical mass and the tendency of Big 
Pharma to site R&D in the headquarter country. These figures may not reflect a direct 
relationship between profit earned and R&D levels, but rather the pattern of industry 
ownership and history. 
 
DeGeorge (2003) states that Big Pharma defends its pricing and associated intellectual 
property (IP) protection strategies with what he terms the ‘Standard Argument’. This is 
based on notions of fairness and the need to encourage new products for the common 
good. Fairness is constructed as the right of pharmaceutical firms to benefit unhindered 
from their work, for a reasonable period (which provides the rationale for IP protection). 
Associated with this, Big Pharma argues that in order to encourage continued investment 
in research and development leading to new products, which can potentially benefit all 
(the common good), there has to be an adequate perceived financial reward to make 
investment in R&D attractive. Industry members also argue that the constant risk of 
obsolescence must be considered in setting prices for pharmaceuticals, which further 
supports their argument for the necessity of high prices to harvest their investments while 
they can. 
 
In sum the industry argues that the prices they charge for their products are a reasonable 
reward for their investment in expensive research and development which ultimately 
benefits society at large, and that theirs is a high risk industry for which there must be 
appropriate rewards to induce participation. 
 
Critique of industry perspective 
Many would argue that the estimated costs of research and development are overstated 
for a number of reasons. Firstly up to 50% of Big Pharma’s current research and 
development budget is spent on developing modifications/enhancements of drugs in 
already crowded markets (Goozner 2004). This viewpoint is supported by Light and 
Lexchin (2003) who show that only 18% of Big Pharma’s research spend is actually on 
basic research, while the preponderance of spend goes on derivate innovations on existing 
drugs and testing. They also point out that half of the sum attributed to R&D costs for 
new drugs is in fact an accounting for opportunity costs rather than actual spend. They 
estimate that the real cost of the development of a new drugs as: i. US$108 million in 
93% of cases (innovations deriving primarily from extensions of existing drugs); and ii. 
US$400 million in just 7% of cases (innovations not derived from existing drugs). 
 
A great deal of the key R&D in the pharmaceutical sector is funded by governments and 
other grant-aiding agencies. For example two of the key drugs used in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS were developed by Yale University and the University of Minnesota and are 
licensed exclusively to Bristol-Myers Squibb and Glaxo Smith Kline respectively.  
 
Conversely it is clear from the OECD report Funding of Public Research and 
Development that industry plays an increasing role in funding research: “… an aggregate 
trend can be identified… an increase in R&D financed and performed by business 
(respectively shifting from 50% and 66% in 1981 to 63% and 69% in 2001) and a decline 
in the public sector’s share in financing (down from 45% in 1981 to around 30% in 
2001).” (47) (Maass 2003) 
This trend is a public good in that it reduces pressures on the public purse, but it also 
raises questions about the relationship between ‘free inquiry’ and the ‘free market’ 
(Fuller 2000). At an ethical level it also raises questions about public control of the 
research agenda, Zimmerman (1995) identified a general trend of shifting a central 
governance function from the political realm to industry or in his terms ‘some of the most 
significant and powerful institutions of our time’(86). In these terms the justification for 
extended exclusive licenses (time limited monopolies) for certain drugs that have very 
high public good utility is not at all proven. Instead of giving monopolies to corporations, 
for potentially the full life cycle of a therapy, it might make more sense to offer publicly 
funded incentives to engage in joint-research for projects of major public concern like 
HIV/AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis. All relevant actors including Big Pharma and the 
universities could be encouraged to cooperate. Priorities might be set at national level by 
governmental agencies and at international level by say the WHO. Licenses to produce 
drugs in this category could be offered on a shareware basis to firms capable of producing 
the drug to the standards required, thus allowing the free-market to operate in the sorts of 
terms contemplated by Adam Smith. Doubtless the research effort would produce 
serendipitous discoveries that have always been a feature in science (Roberts 1989) to the 
benefit of Big Pharma in areas of less critical public good. Likewise independently 
researched discoveries directly relevant for this high level public good could be 
purchased into the system, rather than being developed under exclusive licenses. 
 
Much of the cost attributed as R&D cost can be identified as marketing cost, which 
ultimately contributes to company profits, and is only incurred in the case of successful 
products. Cutting Edge estimate (2003) the costs include the commercialization budget 
and ‘early-stage marketing’. In a separate study Cutting Edge (2003a) estimate that 
pharmaceutical brand teams spend 46% of their total marketing budgets for individual 
products during the launch phase. Big Pharma’s claim that marketing costs are an 
essential element of their budgets and that it is reasonable to attribute them to the overall 
cost of the drug make sense only in areas of low public good where vital public health 
issues are not involved. We need to carefully distinguish between the legitimate 
aspiration of Big Pharma to generate profits and the public good. These are not mutually 
exclusive, but must include a level of responsibility taking both by Big Pharma itself and 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies. 
 
New discoveries, except perhaps in some very rarefied field, are the culmination of all 
previous research. It is disingenuous to present costs as being company-specific, 
especially since a great degree of such research is done in publicly funded institutions and 
other non-industry contexts. There is little truly basic research. If for example a cure is 
discovered for a common cancer, that discovery will have drawn on previous research 
and discoveries, and analysis of the effects and impacts of existing therapies. The 
controversy over Glaxo Smith Kline’s (GSK) patenting of AZT (a key anti-retroviral) 
reflects this scenario. Two scientists, who claim discovery of the compound and its 
effectiveness in treating HIV/AIDS, are publicly supporting the AIDS Healthcare 
Foundation (AHF) in its legal suit against GSK. The AHF, with the support of these two 
scientists, claims that GSK patented a drug it did not invent, which consequently limited 
access to the drug.iv
 
 
Pricing Policy: Utilitarian and Ethical factors 
The cost base used (at least in part) to determine pharmaceutical prices is difficult to pin 
down and is open to interpretation and finessing. While acknowledging the difficulties 
associated with determining cost and the complexities therein, it would be simplistic to 
think that costs are the only factor determining pricing in the pharmaceutical sector. One 
must also consider the market opportunities that are available. If Friedman’s (1970) 
somewhat polemic statement: ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits: s13’ is the guide, then pricing strategy should be determined based on market 
value and on what the consumer is prepared to pay. In fact Friedman spoke specifically of 
the pharmaceutical industry and suggested that it would be inappropriate for managers to 
set their prices according to social objectives and that in so doing they would be shirking 
their primary duty to shareholders, as: “Managers lack the wisdom and ability to resolve 
complex social problems, such as the equitable distribution of pharmaceutical products:” 
(s13) (Friedman 1970).  
Part of Friedman’s assessment of managers, is tenable, even if New Public Management 
takes a different view. However, it hardly absolves the responsibilities of the boards of 
Big Pharma. Ultimately it is not about wisdom but responsibility. Accepting that one does 
not have wisdom (presumably meaning specific expertise) is not a justification for not 
taking responsibility. Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ charges all individuals to act 
responsibly ‘regardless of their individual desires’ or in this case expert competence (Ó 
Tuama 2004). A non-swimmer is not expected to dive into the sea to rescue someone in 
distress, but even the most lax of moral codes would acknowledge that the non-swimmer 
still has responsibility to help save the individual through alternative strategies, for 
instance calling for help or throwing a life-line. 
 
Notwithstanding Friedman, the actions of Big Pharma indicate that they do not operate 
solely from a pure profit motivation aimed at a short-term healthy balance sheet. AMSA 
(2002) figures indicate that 77% of the global pharmaceutical market is accounted for by 
the North American, European and Japanese markets. All of Africa counts for only 1% of 
the pharmaceutical market. If one considers only profit motivation and shareholder value 
then Big Pharma would focus only on advanced economies where many consumers are 
capable of paying substantial prices for pharmaceuticals. It is clear that pharmaceutical 
firms do not restrict themselves to these markets, and in some cases give away product in 
some poorer markets. However some commentators would say rigorous international 
patent protection, and the continued use of market skimming price strategies amounts to a 
decision to focus only on the wealthier markets. One must therefore ask the question, 
why do Big Pharma continue to vigorously protect their patents in markets where the 
likely financial return is always going to be low. 
 
Big Pharma argue that the key concern is the risk of parallel importing from the lower 
priced environments into their more lucrative markets. Essentially patent protection is 
about price protection. This has become an issue of real concern to the pharmaceutical 
sector in recent years. Dyer (2002) quotes cases where essential drugs being channeled to 
the African market at significantly reduced prices have been re-diverted to the more 
lucrative European market by parallel importers. 
 
Big Pharma ostensibly seeks to enforce national patents and related rights, but this may 
mask a deeper strategy. As Feddersen (2003) notes while a patent provides the 
opportunity to obtain recompense for creative effort, it does not guarantee a profit, a view 
supported by the European Court of Justice. It would seem that in many cases Big 
Pharma is looking for the courts to support its policy of differential pricing rather than to 
police actual patent infringement. Practice would seem to support the contention that Big 
Pharma sets prices according to what the market can bear, and once prices are set, it 
actively seeks to protect them. A clear public good issue is that some consumers even in 
wealthier markets will find higher prices unaffordable. 
 
The technical issue of how drug price is determined, successive researchers agree, is 
strongly based on an assessment of what the market can bear, rather than any cost-based 
pricing system. Spinello (1992) gives the example of the controversy of the then 
Burroughs Wellcome’s pricing of AZT. He indicates that industry observers believed the 
price was not based on costs but with reference to expensive cancer therapies, which 
might be considered of similar therapeutic significance. This appears to be borne out by 
the differing pricing approaches used internationally. In the US prices are high reflecting 
both the wealth of the market, and also the high degree of co-payment by insurers, and or 
state bodies. In some markets such as France, Ireland and the United Kingdom where 
there is strong state participation in health care provision, Big Pharma tailor their prices 
to levels acceptable to the key payers, the national health systems. Even in countries with 
national health systems these prices can be quite high and especially so for life-saving 
therapies, and those for rare and uncommon conditions. So price is flexible, and depends 
a great deal on market conditions, likely demand, and who is paying (Brazell 2003). 
 
If one goes on to consider the ethical issues around pricing it becomes more complex. 
Marketing ethics literature shows that there is a great deal of descriptive ethical theory 
relating to marketing (Hunt & Vitell 1986, Ferrell & Gresham 1985, Graddy & Robertson 
1999) and a lot less normative theory. This, it is widely agreed, is due to the difficulties in 
defining absolutist understandings of what constitutes ethical marketing practice. There is 
even less normative material around issues of pricing, though many refer specifically to 
the difficulty of determining and evaluating pricing policy for life-saving drugs.  
 
Using Smith’s (1995) test of consumer sovereignty it is clear that there are ethical 
dilemmas. He suggests three dimensions should be considered: consumer capability; 
information; and choice. While Smith refers specifically to age, education and income as 
vulnerability factors, in relation to consumer capability it would seem obvious that ill 
health would also be a vulnerability factor. So the potential consumers of drugs may not 
be sovereign in relation to capability. In regard to information sovereignty is suspect due 
to the degree to which drug purchase decisions are mediated by third parties such as 
prescribers and health agencies. With regard to choice, in many cases there is limited 
choice or no choice. Applying other frameworks for assessing the potential for ethical 
dilemmas such as Laczniak & Murphy (1993), also confirm that there are numerous 
potential conflicts in this area.  
 
Walton (1969) and Kehoe (1985) acknowledge the difficulties in assessing the morality 
of pricing policy. The underlying difficulty seems to be one of determining how price 
should be set. This is essentially an ideological issue between the concepts of classical 
and neo-classical liberals against those of welfare liberals and social democrats. It is also 
a matter of confusion about the role of the state vis-à-vis the economy. In the first case 
the debate is between the primacy of formal equality over factual equality, the second is 
about the role of government. These issues have been at the heart of the neo-liberal 
project from the 1970s that has sought to dismantle what it deems as the excesses of the 
welfare state model. 
 
The divide between formal and factual equality is essentially about the meaning of rights. 
From a classical liberal perspective the business of rights is primarily about establishing 
the means by which the individual can enjoy a set of rights that hold that all individuals 
are equal. This approach assumes that rights are comprised only of political and legal 
entitlements and that responsibility (or obligation) and solidarity are alien to the liberal 
concept of rights. The matter of obligation or responsibility in Kantian terms is a sine qua 
non at the very core of rights. For Kant the basis for understanding that human rights 
exist is that all humans are innately equal and are due that recognition not on the basis of 
political argumentation but on the basis of an a priori natural right. In those terms human 
rights are an integrated whole not a menu of discreet parts. At their most basic rights 
mean certain entitlements, certain obligations and mutual recognition. In attempting to 
alienate obligation and mutual recognition from rights classical and neo-classical liberals 
are attempting to remove the problematic aspectv
 
 of rights that demand reciprocity and 
obligation. If we do that then rights in a liberal sense no longer have meaning, as they are 
neither justifiable nor enforceable. 
In terms of mutual recognition John Stuart Mill, followed by figures like Keynes and 
Marshall pushed the parameters of liberalism to encapsulate social or factual rights: 
“…that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is 
accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment (104) (Mill  
1991)”. According to Rees (1985), Mill holds that the state and society should not 
encroach too closely on the affairs of the individual and that the individual is charged 
with a responsibility to his/her fellow citizens individually and collectively. This project 
was carried forward by T.H. Marshall (1973) who presented a model of rights which was 
premised on three pillars, the first two broadly those of the classical liberals but his third 
passed firmly into the realm of social rights:“… the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the 
life of a civilized being” (72). 
 
Classical and neo-classical liberals have fundamental objections to these rights. Adam 
Smith’s concept of the invisible hand holds against such constructs. Herein lies the kernel 
of the problem. Essentially for market convenience there is an attempt to slice rights into 
their component parts and cast adrift concepts like responsibility and reciprocity. As 
discussed above that type of argumentation undermines the very nature of rights. It is a 
circular convenience for the justification of action that flies in the face of the very liberal 
rights that are the bedrock of liberalism and the free-market, being justifiable, immutable 
and inalienable. 
De George (2003) argues that the rights endowed by patent protection, and the implied 
right to profit from invention, are outweighed by more fundamental human rights. Shue 
(1981) holds firmly with the welfare strand of liberalism referring to ‘needs which must 
be satisfied in order not to seriously endanger a person’s health and sanity’. According to 
Shue the essence of a basic right is its necessity as a pre-requisite for the enjoyment of 
other rights, he argues that:‘… no individuals or institutions, including corporations, may 
ignore the universal duty to avoid depriving persons of their basic rights’. 
Ethical Concerns in Practice 
His rationale is similar to that used by stakeholder theorists who argue that ‘underlying 
the stakeholder management approach is the ethical imperative that mandates business... 
to respect and fulfill these stakeholders’ rights’ (Weiss 2002). Similarly Donaldson 
(1989) presents the notion of a social contract between business organisations and 
society, which carries associated obligations for both business and society: ‘… society 
has the right to expect that productive organisations will, all other things being equal, 
enhance the general interests of consumers and employees’.  
 
If one accepts De George and Shue’s arguments then it is clear that Big Pharma’s rights 
to IP and reasonable reward are far outweighed by human rights in the case of essential 
drugs. However it doesn’t follow that Big Pharma must give such products away. Nickel 
(1987) expands on the obligations imposed by human rights, taking a Lockean view that 
they have to be ‘affordable’ and balanced against other obligations and constraints. Locke 
believed in ‘a communion, friendship, and mutual assistance’ or in today’s terms 
obligation or duty to fellow citizens (Wilhelm 1999). Like Locke, Donaldson (1989) 
endorses this perspective using the term ‘fairness-affordability’ to describe the balance 
required. He places a reasonable limit on obligation citing certain therapeutic and 
diagnostic techniques like CAT scans and kidney dialysis as examples. His idea of 
reasonable limits could not be stretched to apply to a pandemic like HIV/AIDS that 
threaten the lives of millions of people in an unpredictable fashion, and which must be 
considered extraordinary. On the other hand it is clear that the solution to such 
extraordinary problems is beyond the responsibilities and obligations that we can expect 
of industry. To quote Weiss (2002): ‘Corporations ought to do what they reasonably can 
do’, but to solve a problem of such scale requires a broader response. 
 
Issue of relationship between price and therapeutic value 
Kehoe (ibid) argues, “ethically any price set by a firm should be either equal to or 
proportional to the benefit received”. Herein lies the difficulty with pharmaceutical 
pricing, that of assessing benefit received, and how to relate it to price. Not all drugs are 
of equal therapeutic value, and therefore it may be appropriate to consider the issue of 
pricing policy differently for different categories of drugs. A useful categorization is: 
i. Essential and Breakthrough Drugs – such as the ARVs developed to combat 
HIV/AIDS; 
ii. Me-Too Drugs - which include the drugs developed by competitors of patented 
products, which typically have many of the same properties but fall outside the patent; 
and iii. Cosmetic Drugs – these are non-essential drugs, for instance Botox in cosmetic 
applications. Each of these categories could be argued to carry a common good 
emanating from a laissez faire or invisible hand analysis to a more demanding ethical 
analysis. It is reasonable from our discussion so far to conclude that governments and 
policy-makers should focus their concern on Essential and Breakthrough Drugs, this 
applies to both laissez faire and ethically motivated positions. The market should mediate 
pricing for non-essential therapies, while a more proactive public policy approach is 
needed for essential drugs 
 
Defining what is essential has its pitfalls. Spinello (1992) suggests this can be resolved by 
posing a set of appropriate questions: i. The nature of the malady; ii. Whether it is life-
threatening, or fundamentally threatening to the quality of life; iii. The availability of 
other options, is it a drug of last resort; iv. What other drugs are available and at what 
prices? v. At planned prices will people be deprived? vi. What support can be expected 
from funding sources in co-payment? vii. Who is the likely end-user? and viii. What is 
their capacity to pay? 
 
The WHO actually defines a list of essential medicines, which includes 319 medicines 
(Attaran 2004) but in so doing considers cost-effectiveness in defining its core list. MSF 
(2001) argue that a number of drugs that could be considered medically essential are not 
included because of patent requirements, or cost considerations. With both Spinello 
(1992) and the WHO’s definition of essential there are two key difficulties. Firstly, there 
is implicit in both a price floor of affordability. In Spinello’s case he refers to the need to 
identify a pricing level at which people might be deprived, and in the WHO case they 
consider cost-effectiveness. Secondly there is also an issue of relativity. The perception 
of how essential a drug is relates to overall societal norms of health and well-being, 
which tend to vary with national wealth. 
 
A further very real risk with such discrimination is that firms would focus their efforts 
and their research and development on the categories of drugs that would be less 
restricted, and reduce emphasis on the essential/breakthrough category because of the 
high degree of intervention. It could be argued that this is already occurring and that 
some firms are re-focusing their R&D strategies away from the essential drug category 
since the Doha decision. This is premised on a perceived risk of intervention in pricing 
strategy should a firm develop a breakthrough drug of sufficient significance, e.g. a cure 
for a major cancer.  
 
It is intuitively easy to accept the arguments of NGOs, disease victims and national 
governments that restricting the access to essential drugs through high pricing policy is 
undesirable. What is not so easy is to identify a way forward. We propose a number of 
potential strategies that should be considered to deal with a very real common good issue, 
while both balancing the rights of industry and ensuring the continued pursuit of free 
inquiry and discovery in pharmaceuticals. 
 
Potential Policy and Pricing Strategies 
We have seen in the discussion above that the current ad hoc arrangements do not work, 
even where there is goodwill on all sides to reach a solution. Issues like parallel trade, 
medical training and infrastructure, poverty, distribution, aid, corruption, and ideology all 
interact with the prospects of reaching a common approach. We don’t propose a single 
solution as much as possible strategies for dealing with a major global crisis.  
 
A. Low Intervention—Strong Free-Market Model 
In debates on pharmaceutical pricing in the United States Big Pharma argues that free 
enterprise and unrestrained competition will encourage fair prices. However it is a 
misrepresentation to suggest that even in the United States a free market exists for 
pharmaceuticals. As long as newly developed drugs are under patent they are protected 
from competition and the manufacturer can charge higher prices than they would be able 
to in a competitive marketplace, even accepting the presence of me-too drugs in the 
market. Bell (2001) points out that the pharmaceutical market is inherently an imperfect 
market, i.e. one where competition ‘is flawed by the ability of one or more parties to 
influence prices’. He cites as a specific illustration the case of Big Pharma in Africa 
where the industry has such power over the price of drugs. So in essence there is no free 
market. 
 
B. Mediated Intervention-Mediated Market Model 
The current system operated by the British government, the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS)vi
 
 1999 offers a good model. The PPRS builds on the 
Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme established in 1953. It restricts pharmaceutical 
industry profit levels and seeks to do this by referencing the capital markets. 
Pharmaceutical firms are allowed to achieve profits in the range of 17-21%, with a 
margin of tolerance of 8.4%. Originally developed as a voluntary model, in recent years it 
has been underpinned by statutes giving the NHS the right to reduce prices where 
participating companies are reluctant to reduce prices. In calculating costs before profits 
they are allowed to include costs of production, a sales promotion allowance and a 
research and development allowance. Firms whose prices lead to profits beyond this must 
reduce their prices or pay a rebate to the government. The adoption of a similar model on 
an agreed international basis could deal with the issue of industry profit levels, and 
reduce some of the inflationary pressure, but it does not solve the pricing issue. However 
given that profits are directly related to prices achieved, if there is monitoring and 
management of overall profit levels it is reasonable to expect an impact on pricing levels. 
In terms of research and development a model (discussed above) of publicly funded 
incentives to engage in joint-research for projects of major public concern could be 
included. Big Pharma could participate with other private and public institutions like 
universities and hospital. Priorities could be set through a consultative process at national 
and/or international level. The process of licensing would focus on public good 
imperatives and the capacity of licensees to deliver and distribute quality 
pharmaceuticals. The model should also allow for the purchase of independently 
researched discoveries of major public good utility. 
 
Conclusion 
Building on the analysis that has been developed in this paper, we would propose 
adopting some form of B. Mediated Intervention-Mediated Market Model. International 
drug pricing is so central an issue as to require an extra-industry solution. The 
international community cannot disassociate itself from contributory responsibility for 
ongoing difficulties in access to therapeutic pharmaceuticals. Governments, and extra-
governmental organisations such as the UN should seek to partner with industry to arrive 
at useful resolutions. This must include an acceptance of the need for some element of 
price control and regulation. This would not be without pain for all parties, but would 
deliver clear public goods, among which being market competition. 
 
The industry would have to submit to greater monitoring and intervention, though 
perhaps with a concomitant increase in public goodwill and a reduction in negative 
publicity. There are precedents for this type of voluntary industry submission to 
regulation. For example on a national level: the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators 
(INPO) established in the United States in 1979 in the wake of the Three Mile Island 
disaster; and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board set up under the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002 following the Enron and Worldcom debacles, and on an international 
level: the Chemical Manufacturers Association’s (CMA) Responsible Care programme 
developed in the 1980’s in response to the Bhopal Disaster which involves manufacturers 
in 37 countries on five continents. While some would critique these as being merely 
“multi-million dollar public relations exercises” (447) (Rees, 2003), there is evidence to 
suggest that the CMA and the INPO have achieved progress in both industry behaviour 
and realization of responsibility. 
 
National governments would have to agree to joint positions on pricing, and the current 
subvention of some markets by others would be likely decline. The United States 
government in particular is likely to have significant difficulty in reaching agreement on 
this given the long history of government industry interdependence. However the advent 
of trading blocs such as NAFTA and the newly expanded EU should in part facilitate this. 
In fact in October 2002 the European Commission proposed the development of a price 
regulation scheme for the entire European Union, though the mechanics and operation of 
such a scheme are still very much in development. 
 
How Big Pharma determines prices for new products will continue to be an issue. 
Moving towards the type of model we propose might in fact help the industry to stabilize 
prices and reduce risk. Big Pharma would be less exposed to acute market vagaries like 
that which hit Elan over the Tysabri crisis in February/March 2005vii
 
, by avoiding having 
all its eggs in one basket. For high volume public good pharmaceuticals they would share 
both the costs and benefits. In the areas of low market returns like very poor economies 
or very specialized therapies risk would be softened by a governmental cushion as 
envisaged by thinkers from Adam Smith to J.M. Keynes.  
Already there is scope within the industry itself to deal with pricing policy in a more 
ethical way without risking major costs. Big Pharma firms generally have a range of 
products, they operate internal cross-subsidization of products, and negotiate with major 
buyers across their entire product range, rather than on specific products. All of these 
strategies reduce exposure. 
 
Pharmaceutical pricing is a complex issue. However we can achieve greater clarity on 
rights and obligations when addressing essential drugs. What is clear is that this issue is 
more than commercial, it is essentially about the common good. Facing up to that reality 
is an important starting point. Adam Smith, as discussed above, saw the limitations of the 
free-market and the necessity of governmental intervention in certain cases. Essential 
pharmaceuticals to deal with a global level crisis like HIV/AIDS must fall into that 
category. Once we accept this premise, then it is a question of how we address the 
problem. From this base line we can begin to frame the problem not as one only of the 
market, corporations, share dividend, pricing, patents and licenses, but also of the public 
good. In terms of the public good we must then engage in the balance of rights and 
responsibilities, such that the greatest common good can be achieved with the least level 
of interference with private rights.  
 
The discussion here while focused on the pharmaceuticals has implications across a wide 
range of industries. Challenges of considerable public concern at a macro-level such as 
the environment, climate and world development and at a more micro-level including 
retail banking’s impact on social fabric through over-generous lending, or fast food 
companies’ potential to impact on public health, contain many of the same dilemmas 
raised here. They all centre around issues concerning the public good and the interests of 
corporations. The Mediated Intervention – Mediated Market Model might well provide a 
possible route for addressing some of these challenges. 
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i In an interview in 1987 Margaret Thatcher stated ‘… and who is society? There is no such thing! There 
are individual men and women and there are families’ and later in the interview: ‘There is no such thing as 
society’. See Douglas Keay (1987) ‘Aids, education and the year 2000!’ Woman's Own pp8-10. Also 
available at the Thatcher Foundation http://www.margaretthatcher.com. 
ii Given Big Pharma’s case that pharmaceuticals are constantly at risk of obsolescence the time scale of the 
patent-guaranteed monopoly may extend beyond the product life cycle of the therapy. 
iii The term ‘post-code lottery’ has been used by the UK media to describe the variations that occur in 
access to health treatments and therapies, based on geographic location. 
iv www.aidshealth.org/newsroom/press/press_archive/PR120502.htm 
v By problematic we mean those aspects of rights that challenge a notion of the free-market that has not 
ethical or moral basis. 
vi 
www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/MedicinesPharmacyAndIndustry/PharmaceuticalPriceRegulationSche
me/ThePPRSScheme/fs/en 
vii “Patient Dies: Biogen, Elan Halt MS Drug” 
www.reuters.com/financeNewsArticle.jhtml?type=businessNews&storyID=7761714 
                                                 
 
